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Abstract. 
The paper reviews and evaluates in a non-technical manner the economic 
and political arguments for and against the two fiscal -convergence criteria 
written into the Treaty of Maastricht and its Protocols. In order to qualify 
for full membership in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) net general 
government borrowing may not exceed three percent of GDP and general 
government gross debt may not exceed sixty percent of GDP. The paper 
concludes that the adoption of the two universal fiscal reference values is 
arbitrary, that is without theoretical or practical foundation. It reflects 
the triumph of central bank (especially Bundesbank) fiscal-political dogma 
over economic reasoning and common sense. Attempts to meet these fiscal norms 
would result in unnecessary hardship for a number of countries and in a 
deflationary fiscal stance for the EC as a whole. 
JEL Classification Numbers: 431, 432, 423, 320, 325. 
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(1) Introduction. 
The beast may only have one number, 666, Maastricht has two, 3 and 60. 
The Treaty of Maastricht and the protocols attached to it contain a number of 
convergence criteria that must be satisfied by member states in order to 
qualify for full membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This 
paper analyses the two quantitative criteria for avoiding and correcting 
"excessive government deficits". Net borrowing by the general government 
sector may be no higher than 3 percent of GDP and general government gross 
debt may not exceed 60 percent of GDP. By comparison, the Dutch government 
had a deficit of 4.4 percent of GDP in 1991 and its gross debt at the end of 
1991 is estimated at 78.4 percent of GDP. Table 1 shows the situation for all 
twelve EC member states in 1991. 
Table 1 
















EC Average 60.3** 




















It is apparent from Table 1 that only France, the UK and Luxembourg win 
for Europe on both fronts (in Germany the government deficit for 1991 will 
almost certainly be higher than 3 %of GDP). 
The two hard quantitative norms are to some extent qualified, softened 
and rendered fuzzy by the surrounding text. If the deficit is above its 
reference value, here need be no cause for alarm as long as the deficit-GDP 
ratio has declined substantially and continuously and does not exceed the 
reference value by too much on the proposed accession date. Exceptional and 
temporary excesses of the actual over the reference ratio are also permitted. 
If the debt-GDP ratio is too high, there will be sanctions only if the ratio 
is not sufficiently diminishing and not approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace (it does not say for whom the pace should be satisfactory). 
Policy makers may allow for the relationship between the government deficit 
and government investment, and indeed for all other relevant factors, 
including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the member state. 
Vhen a member state fails to comply with the recommendations of the 
Council of Ministers, a number of sanctions may be invoked. The European 
Investment Bank may be invited to reconsider its lending policy to the member 
state. The member state may be required to make a non interest-bearing 
deposit with the Community. Fines may be imposed. Vhen a member state is in 
the fiscal dog house, it may not vote in the Council of Ministers on issues 
related to EMU (except presumably on issues such as the exchange rate regime 
between its own currency, which will perforce continue to exist, and the ECU, 
the common currency of the full EMU members). It will not be able to appoint 
representatives to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) or 
to its Executive Board. 
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(2) Where do these reference values come from? 
Vb.ere do these two fiscal criteria come from? As regards the debt-GDP 
reference value, one "explanation" is that 60 percent of GDP is approximately 
the average value of this ratio for the twelve Community members in 1990-91. 
This is not true for the deficit-GDP reference value. Its average value 
during 1990 was 4.1 percent of GDP. In 1991 it will also be significantly 
above the reference value of 3 percent. 1 
With a bit of goodwill, the two reference values can be said to be 
compatible with a stationary long-run equilibrium, based upon the status quo 
of the (mythical) average EC member. For instance, without monetary financing 
and with a growth rate of real GDP of 3 percent per annum and an inflation 
rate of 2 percent per annum, the reference values of 60 percent and 3 percent 
are consistent with a stationary equilibrium.2 
It should be obvious (but unfortunately does not appear to be so) that 
elevating these reference values (or indeed any reference values) to 
international norms or standards is unadulterated economic nonsense, and 
dangerous nonsense to boot. The average current value of the debt-GDP ratio 
or the average-current-value-minus-a-bit of the deficit-GDP ratio have no 
normative significance whatsoever. With equal (lack of) justification one 
could have chosen the numbers 12 (the number of the apostles) and 42 (the 
answer to the question about life, the universe and everything3). At the risk 
of belaboring the obvious, I briefly review fourteen economic arguments. 
(1) The debt criterion is defined in terms of the nominal or face value 
of gross rather than of net government debt. Government assets therefore are 
not counted, not even financial assets and other quite readily marketable, 
liquid assets. There is no good reason for taking so restrictive a view of 
the government balance sheet4. In the Netherlands, government assets such as 
4 
those accumulated by the ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds) to fund 
future civil service pensions are sufficient to bring net government debt down 
to less than 60 percent of GDP. Not counting such public sector assets biases 
the comparison of the Netherlands, where civil service pensions are funded, 
with countries that pay for civil service pensions using an unfunded scheme. 
Table 2 shows that the differences between net and gross debt can be sizable. 
Table 2. 
EC General Government Gross and Net Debt, in 1990. 


























Greece 93.7 85.2 NA 
Ireland 103.0 113.0 NA 













* Vest Germany. 
**On a SNA basis except for the UK and Greece where the data are based on 
national methods. 
Sources: EC and OECD Economic Outlook. 
(2) By elevating the European average of the debt-GDP ratios and a number 
below the European average of the deficit-GDP ratios to the status of 
one-sided or asymmetric norms (values above the norm are not permitted, values 
below the norm are), fiscal policy in the EC will subject to a contractionary 
bias during the next few years. There is no mention in the Treaty of the need 
for a less restrictive average stance of monetary policy to compensate for 
I 
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this deflationary fiscal bias. 
(3) The automatic fiscal stabilizers ensure that the government deficit 
rises in a slump and falls during a boom. According to the Maastricht Treaty 
and protocols, cyclical variations in the government deficit centered on the 
reference value of 3 percent would not be permitted, since cyclical excesses 
of the actual deficit over the reference value would be temporary but 
certainly not exceptional. In order not to exceed the 3 percent ceiling on a 
regular basis, the deficit will have to cycle around an average value of less 
than 3 percent of GDP. This reinforces the contractionary bias of the deficit 
norm during the transitional period. 
(4) For those who favor a Keynesian approach to the determination of the 
level of economic activity, the average monetary-fiscal policy "mix" for the 
Community as a whole (in relation to the mixes in North America and Japan) are 
a concern. Maastricht is silent on this issue. 
(5) The Treaty refers, without mentioning it by name, to the "golden 
rule" of government financing: balance the current budget and borrow no more 
than the amount of capital formation. The German negotiators were especially 
keen on this "rule for virtuous borrowing". The practical problems associated 
with any attempt to distinguish consumption spending from investment are well 
known. "Current" expenditures on education, such as teachers salaries are an 
obvious example. Even if that problem has been overcome, the "golden rule" 
for government financing makes no sense and can lead to bad policy choices. 
First, there is nothing wrong with borrowing to finance consumption 
expenditures, even if we ignore possible Keynesian benefits in economies with 
widespread capacity under utilization. As long as the borrower realizes that 
ceteris paribus future consumption will have to decline in present value by as 
much as current consumption increases, there is no prima facie reason to 
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second guess his intertemporal choices. One of the most important papers in 
the post World War II economics literature (Samuelson [1958]) introduced the 
consumption-loan model; this in now at the center of most interesting dynamic 
macroeconomic modeling. Consumption smoothing when income is variable and/or 
uncertain is optimal according to the permanent income-life cycle hypothesis. 
The bias against consumption loans by the government that underlies the 
golden rule of government finance is an example of what in Britain used to be 
called the Treasury view, but should today be called central bank economic 
ideology. Central bankers, whose Weltanschauung permeates and dominates the 
sections of the Treaty dealing with EMU, tend to possess a paternalistic 
puritan streak that compels them to exhort others to choose consumption 
tomorrow over consumption today. In my view, such personal or group 
idiosyncrasies should not be allowed to interfere with the free expression of 
private and public intertemporal choices, unless they are backed up with a 
convincing demonstration that major market failure has resulted in saving 
rates lower than the social optimum. 
Second, many socially useful and desirable government investment projects 
do not, either directly (say, through user fees) or indirectly (say, by 
boosting the tax base) increase the future balance of receipts over 
non-interest expenditures by an amount at least equal in present discounted 
value to the cost of the projects. In that case financing by borrowing must 
sooner or later be supplemented by policies to raise revenues or cut 
non-interest expenditures. The social rate of return on a government 
investment project need bear no relation to its effect on the government's 
future cash flow 5 • To the extent that the government does not appropriate 
(directly or indirectly) the returns to public sector investment, the "golden 
rule" of public sector financing may be an recipe for weakening the public 
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sector balance sheet that can ultimately lead to insolvency. Therefore, 
government investment can be financed safely through borrowing only if this 
investment will in the future reduce the primary government deficits by enough 
to compensate for the higher interest payments associated with the borrowing. 
(6) The neoclassical theory of the optimal use of distortionary taxes 
suggests that temporary (exogenous) increases in expenditures and temporary 
(exogenous) reductions in the tax base should be reflected in temporary 
government deficits and permanently higher tax rates. A simple special case 
of this theory implies that under the optimal tax rule the public debt will 
follow a "random walk" 6, This means that the optimally chosen value of the 
public debt will, in due course, exceed or fall below any imaginable value, no 
matter how high or low. The number 60 (or any other number) does not have 
special significance in this approach (see e.g. Barro [1979]). 
The strict random walk result relies on very restrictive assumptions and 
should not be taken seriously. It has been referred to only to underline that 
even those approaches to positive economics and to economic policy design that 
are furthest removed from the Keynesian paradigm, can come up with 
prescriptions for the behavior of public debt and deficits that are orthogonal 
to the Maastricht rules. 
(7) Countries with a higher growth rate of real GDP can ceteris paribus 
safely support a higher deficit-GDP ratio. Do the authors of the Maastricht 
Treaty assume that henceforth all member states will have the same growth 
rates of real GDP? 
(8) The same holds in principle for countries with a higher rate of 
inflation. Ve can expect that, if and when the member states of the EC have a 
common currency, there will be no sizable permanent national or regional 
differences in inflation rates 7 Until we get to that point, however, there 
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are likely to be differences. The inflation convergence criterion permits 
inflation up to 1.5 percent per annum higher (during the year before EMU 
judgment day) than the average of the three countries with the lowest rate of 
inflation s. 
lore generally, it is strange that the government deficit norm makes no 
allowance for the distinction between nominal and real interest rates on the 
public debt. 
(9) There is no apparent relationship between the two budgetary norms and 
the criteria commonly used by economists to evaluate the solvency of the 
government. The government is said to be solvent if the nominal or face value 
of the public debt held outside the central bank is no greater than the 
present discounted value of the future expected primary government surpluses 
plus the present discounted value of the future expected increases in credit 
extended to the government by the central bank (see e.g. Buiter [1983]). An 
equivalent solvency criterion is that the present discounted value of 
government debt very far in the future will ultimately be non-positive 9 
There is no relationship between these solvency criteria and the debt or 
deficit norms of laastricht. 
(10) One often hears references to so-called "external effects" of 
government budget deficits (see e.g. the clear discussion in Bovenberg et. al. 
[1991] and the much less clear discussion in Commission of the European 
Communities [1991]). If, for instance, the German government finances its 
deficit in the capital markets, this will ceteris paribus raise real interest 
rates in Germany and in all countries tied to Germany through efficient 
capital markets 10. From this premise, which is non-controversial (unless one 
is a believer in Ricardian equivalence) it is then inferred quite 
illegitimately, that such negative external effects must be opposed and, if 
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possible, avoided altogether. Both the designation "external effects" and the 
characterization "negative" reflect sloppy thinking. 
When I increase my purchases of bananas in a competitive market with an 
upward-sloping banana supply schedule, the price of bananas will rise. This 
is good news for all those who are long in bananas (net banana exporters) and 
bad news for all those who are short in bananas (net banana importers). The 
increase in the price of bananas is exactly what ought to happen if the market 
system is to do its job of allocating resources efficiently. The price 
increase inflicted by me on other banana buyers and sellers is what economists 
call a pecuniary externality. It is to be distinguished sharply from 
technological externalities, effects of one agent's actions on the 
consumptions sets, utility functions or production functions of other agents 
for which no appropriate price is charged. In complete competitive markets, 
no adverse efficiency consequences are associated with pecuniary 
externalities. They are merely another word for general market 
interdependence. As is clear from the banana example, the price changes will 
have distributional consequences. If these are undesirable, policy makers are 
free to do something about that with the most effective redistribution 
instruments at their disposal. 
What is true for bananas is also true for government debt. When a 
government finances a deficit in the capital markets and interest rates rise, 
this is good news for creditors everywhere and bad news for debtors 
everywhere 11 • If this form of redistribution is undesirable, governments are 
free to respond appropriately. It is extremely unlikely, that the best way to 
achieve the desired redistribution is by forbidding budget deficits above a 
certain level. Note that it is also quite irrelevant whether the deficits 
under consideration finance public consumption or productive public 
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investment. 
There are theoretical arguments for the international coordination of 
virtually every aspect of budgetary policy, with the exception of government 
deficits and government debt. Public consumption and investment may have 
technological external effects that render coordination desirable in principle 
(the practical problems of productive international coordination are an 
important subject in their own right, which cannot be addressed here). It is 
also well-know that the uncoordinated setting of national distortionary 
taxes, transfers and subsidies can lead to Pareto-inefficient outcomes, that 
is outcomes that are inferior for all parties involved to some other 
technically feasible outcome. The examples of international tax competition, 
of national subsidy races and of the competitive dismantling of national 
welfare systems in order to attract foreign direct investment come to mind. 
Vith government borrowing things are different. There already is an 
international coordination mechanism, the international financial markets. 
Vhy does Brussels insist on encumbering with international quantitative norms 
the one corner of budgetary policy where there is no case for international 
coordination? The much-vaunted principle of subsidiarity has been trampled 
quite blatantly. 
Of course, national governments can, as part of their macroeconomic 
planning procedures, specify intermediate targets and hard or soft rules and 
norms for their entire fiscal instrumentarium, including the tax burden, 
marginal tax, transfer and subsidy rates, public consumption and investment, 
government deficits, government debt and monetary growth. Such intermediate 
targets, norms and rules should prescribe (or proscribe) actions at a 
particular time, in a particular place and given a particular state of nature. 
They should be contingent or conditional. One would therefore not expect to 
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find them written into a national constitution or international treaty as a 
set of fixed numbers. Moreover, as regards government deficits or debt, there 
is no efficiency case for international coordination of national targets, 
norms or rules. That is what we have international financial markets for. 
(11) Another assertion one hears quite frequently is that with a fixed 
exchange rate (and a fortiori with a common currency), national governments 
that issue debt denominated in the common currency will not be subject to 
effective discipline and restraint by the financial markets. This argument 
has very little going for it. 
Assume that EMU is a fact and that a common currency (the ECU) has been 
adopted. If for instance the German government, unwilling to face paying the 
price of German unification, were to continue with the issuing of massive 
amounts of debt (now denominated in ECUs), it would in due course have to pay 
a growing sovereign risk premium in its ECU interest rate. In addition, and 
more important in practice, it would sooner or later encounter credit 
rationing. It would be unable to sell debt in any currency and at any rate of 
interest. 
The disappearance of the national currency implies that exchange rate 
risk disappears as a source of national interest differentials. Other forms 
of risk (especially sovereign default risk) will continue to be priced in the 
market and to be reflected in quantitative constraints on borrowing. 
For the proper functioning of the national and international credit 
markets it is necessary that the member states of the EMU (and the 
supranational organs of the Community) make it absolutely clear and credible, 
that national debt is and remains the exclusive obligation and responsibility 
of the national government in question and of those who, now or in the future, 
pay taxes to this government 12. The same is of course true without EMU and 
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without a common currency. Whether or not such a commitment against debt bail 
outs can be made credible is a practical political issue. Experience shows 
that this is not difficult in practice. For instance, in the US this has long 
been the case for the debt of individual states and of local government units. 
I see no reason to believe that intra-Community international solidarity 
will be strengthened by EMU, or that EMU will strengthen the bargaining power 
of debtor governments vis-a-vis creditor governments. What, after all, can 
post-EMU debtor governments threaten creditor governments with that they 
cannot threaten them with today? That they would abandon EMU and restore 
their national currencies? How does this threaten creditor governments? That 
they would default or some or all of their internally or externally held debt? 
That option is equally available with or without a common currency, and the 
costs to the defaulter are well-known. 
If, for instance, the German government were to default on its 
obligations towards creditors resident in Germany, this would be a strictly 
German problem; at the very least the defaulting government would pay at the 
next election. If German government non-performance were at the expense of 
creditors resident in other EMU countries, there should be no special 
obligation for the non-German governments or for the supranational Community 
agencies to compensate the losers. One would of course expect the other 
national, regional or supranational authorities and the non-German private 
sector to impose the usual sanctions for foreign sovereign default: no further 
credit; current transactions on a cash-in-advance basis only; attachment of 
German official assets abroad etc. 
If a national government debt default threatened to have adverse systemic 
effects, say for the functioning of the community-wide financial system (or 
for a key part of it like the banking system or the payments system), the 
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damage can be limited (and serious damage avoided altogether) through 
cooperative action by the national governments of the other Community 
countries and the supranational bodies. Such concerted systemic support need 
not imply ,de jure or de facto, that the defaulting government is relieved of 
its debt burden. Consider for instance the case where a large chunk of the 
defaulting national government's debt is held by that nation's banking system. 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) can play the "lender of last resort" function without "taking over" the 
debt of the defaulting government and without raising the trend rate of growth 
of the nominal money stock in the EC as a whole. 
(12) Then there is the argument, that the fiscal norms are necessary to 
render it impossible (or at any rate unlikely) that the new ESCB will 
effectively be forced to monetize the budget deficits of countries without 
fiscal discipline (Greece, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Germany since 
unification). This is a special case of what was discussed under item (11). 
The formal independence of the proposed ESCB and ECB vis a vis the 
governments of the member states and the supranational authorities of the 
European Communities is greater even than the formal independence of the 
Bundesbank today. This holds for the appointment procedures for members of 
the Executive Board and Governing Council and for the absolute ban on 
overdrafts and other credit facilities with the ESCB and ECB for all EC, 
national, regional, local and other public authorities. The ban on direct 
purchases of government debt instruments by the ESCB is of course meaningless, 
since "indirect" purchases (that is all purchases of debt instruments in the 
secondary markets) are permitted. 
The one major formal blot on the ESCB independence banner is the vague 
and confusing verbiage in the Treaty concerning the powers of the Council of 
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Ministers over the common external exchange rates. Central bank independence 
requires that the central bank be in charge of exchange rate policy. If the 
Council of Ministers were to have any powers over exchange rate determination 
other than the ability to determine just the broadest possible features of the 
exchange rate regime or system (fixed versus managed floating etc.), then the 
independence of the ESCB would be seriously undermined. Would the Council of 
Ministers for instance have the authority to decide that the value of the ECU 
should be fixed in terms of some basket of non-ECU currencies? If the answer 
is "yes", the independence of the ESCB would be vacuous, unless the ESCB can 
assume a leadership role vis a vis the central banks of the rest of the world, 
more or less like the Bundesbank today within the EMS. 
Note, however, that these limits on formal independence also apply in 
spades to today's most independent national central bank, the Bundesbank. It 
had at most an advisory role in the process leading to the German government's 
early support for EMU and a common currency. It was completely ignored when 
Chancellor Kohl opted for accelerated monetary unification of the two German 
states and picked an exchange rate for the Vest German and East German marks. 
Even if a central bank is formally completely independent of the 
executive and legislative powers, it remains possible that its effective or 
substantive independence is severely restricted by other agents (such as the 
ministry of finance) who can maneuver it into a position where its domain of 
choice is very limited. While this is in principle a possibility with the 
ESCB, it will not be relevant in practice because after EMU any national 
fiscal authority will be in a considerably weaker position vis a vis the new 
ESCB, than it is today vis a vis its own national central bank. The ESCB will 
remain the "leader" in the monetary-fiscal game of chicken (see Sargent [1986, 
pp. 19-39]) at least until the supranational institutions of the EC are as 
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strong relative to the ESCB as today's national Treasuries are in relation to 
their national central banks 
(13) By borrowing instead of covering its expenditures with current 
taxes, the government engages, given the structure of taxation and transfer 
payments in countries like the Netherlands, in redistribution from the younger 
(working) current generations and from future generations to the current older 
(retired) generations. At given (intertemporal) relative prices, this boosts 
aggregate consumption today, at the expense of current saving and therefore 
(barring Keynesian miracles) at the expense of consumption tomorrow. It is 
important to realize that the government can, through its budgetary 
instruments, achieve exactly the same redistribution and exactly the same 
stimulus to current consumption with a balanced budget (see e.g. Buiter and 
Kletzer [1992b]). The government deficit and the government debt must be seen 
in the context of the sum total of redistribution mechanisms between 
generations. 
Is it appropriate to set norms cooperatively in Europe for 
intergenerational redistribution and for redistribution between creditors and 
debtors (when intergenerational redistribution changes intertemporal relative 
prices)? I am not aware that this has been the subject of intergovernmental 
discussion at the EC level. Indeed, there is little or no consensus on these 
issues within national economies. Even if cooperative determination of 
intergenerational and debtor-creditor redistribution were on the EC menu, it 
still remains a mystery why identical norms are prescribed for countries that 
differ in private sector saving behavior, in investment behavior, in the 
structure of government revenues and outlays, in demographic structure and in 
749 other relevant respects. 
(14) Finally, it should be clear that the budgetary norms are neither 
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necessary, nor sufficient, nor useful for satisfying the other convergence 
criteria in the Treaty of Maastricht (those with respect to inflation, 
interest rates and exchange rates). 
The conclusion is unavoidable that the primitive fiscal norms in the 
laastricht Treaty are arbitrary and without any theoretical or practical 
foundation. Attempts to satisfy these criteria are likely to be damaging. 
(3) What happens if the Netherlands tries to satisfy the fiscal norms of 
laastricht? 
In order to answer this question, I use a simple formula based on the 
government budget identity (for details see the Appendix). One possible 
policy to achieve the debt norm post-haste will be not be considered further. 
That is a capital levy on the holders of government debt, the legal face of 
debt default. 
The first question that can be answered easily with this formula is the 
following. Starting from an initial debt-GDP ratio, b , of 0.79 (seventy nine 
0 
percent of GDP), how long would it take the Netherlands to satisfy the 
* laastricht debt-GDP norm, b , of 0.6 (sixty percent of GDP) if it were to 
0 
* satisfy immediately and continuously the Maastricht deficit-GDP norm, d, of 
0.03 (three percent of GDP)? 
In order to perform the calculations we need two further data: a 
projection of the growth rate of nominal GDP, g, (assumed constant) and a 
projection of the credit extended by the central bank to the government in the 
future as a fraction of GDP, s. I refer to this as seigniorage1 3. It is 
assumed to be constant in the calculations that follow. 
lib.at are reasonable values for the growth rate of nominal GDP and for 
seigniorage? The average growth rate of nominal GDP for the Netherlands over 
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the period 1984-1991 was 4.4 percent per annum (real GDP growth over the same 
period was 2.3 percent per annum). I shall therefore start with a 4 percent 
annual growth rate for nominal GDP. As the results of the calculations are 
less painful the higher the growth rate of nominal GDP, I shall repeat them 
for g = 5.0% and g = 6.0%. 
I have estimated credit extended to the government by the Dutch central 
bank somewhat crudely by subtracting total official foreign exchange reserves 
from total central bank assets and differencing the resulting series. The 
average value of s during the nine years 1982 to 1990 was a minuscule 0.11% 
(just over one tenth of one percent of GDP). This value is used throughout, 
but nothing much would change if it were doubled or set to zero. 
The value oft, the number of years until the debt norm is satisfied is 
given in Table 3. 
Table 3 
How long until the Netherlands satisfies the debt reference value? 
* b * bo d s g t 
%GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP %p.a. No. years 
60.0 79.0 3.0 0.11 4.0 II) 
60.0 79.0 3.0 0.11 5.0 45.31 
60.0 79.0 3.0 0.11 6.0 15.96 
Explanation: 
* b: Reference value of public debt as a percentage of GDP. 
b : Actual value, at the beginning of 1992, of public debt as a 
0 
percentage of GDP. 
d * : Reference value of the government deficit as a percentage
of GDP. 
s: Credit extended by the central bank to the government as a 
percentage of GDP. 
g: Annual percentage growth rate of nominal GDP. 
t: Number of years until the reference value is achieved. 
18 
With a 4% per annum growth rate of nominal GDP, the Netherlands would 
never achieve the debt norm, even if it were to satisfy the deficit norm 
forthwith. In the long run the debt-GDP ratio would asymptotically approach 
72.25%. The growth rate of GDP must be at least 4.82% per annum if the debt 
norm is to be achieved. 
With a 5% per annum growth rate of nominal GDP, the debt norm can be 
satisfied in a little over 45 years. With a 6% per annum growth rate of 
nominal GDP the debt target is achieved in just under 16 years. While it is 
nice to know that the Netherlands will be ready in the year 2037 or 2008, it 
would be a bit late to play a role in EMU. The second phase of EMU begins on 
January 1, 1994. The third and last phase begins no earlier than 31 December 
1996 and no later than January 1, 1999. 
How small is the constant deficit (as a fraction of GDP) that will enable 
the Netherlands to satisfy the debt norm on December 31, 1996 or on January 1, 
* 1999? Table 4 provides some illustrative calculations. t is the number of 
years (5 or 7) until the Netherlands reaches the debt norm. dis the 
government deficit (as a percentage of GDP) required to reach the debt target. 
19 
Table 4. 
Hov large a deficit vill bring the Netherlands to the debt target on tille? 
b* t * bo s g d 
%GDP %GDP No. years %GDP %p.a. %GDP 
60.0 79.0 5.0 0.11 2.0 -2.30 
60.0 79.0 5.0 0.11 4.0 -0.92 
60.0 79.0 5.0 0.11 5.0 -0.23 
60.0 79.0 5.0 0.11 6.0 0.45 
60.0 79.0 7.0 0.11 2.0 -1.22 
60.0 79.0 7.0 0.11 4.0 0.16 
60.0 79.0 7.0 0.11 5.0 0.84 
60.0 79.0 7.0 0.11 6.0 1.53 
Explanation (see also Table 3).
* t : Number of years until the debt reference value must be reached. 
d: Required government deficit as a percentage of GDP. 
The figures in Table 4 would be alarming if the Netherlands actually were 
to feel obliged to satisfy the debt norm by the end of 1996 or the beginning 
of 1999. With a 5 % annual growth rate of nominal GDP the Dutch government 
would have to produce a surplus of 0.23% of GDP in order to wear the winner's 
wreath of laurels at the beginning of 1997. If the target date is two years 
later, a deficit of 0.84% of GDP is permitted. Both figures (fortunately) are 
politically quite out of the question. 
If the Netherlands were to succeed in getting inflation down to zero 
while keeping the growth rate of real GDP at 2% per annum, the result would be 
budgetary disaster. If the debt norm is to be achieved by the end of 1996, a 
budget surplus of 2.3% of GDP is required. If D-day is the beginning of 1999, 
a surplus of 1.22% of GDP will be required. It is true that the lower rate of 
inflation will be reflected in lower nominal interest rates. The required 
reduction in the primary deficit implied by the debt target is therefore 
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smaller than the reduction in the deficit (which includes nominal interest 
payments on the debt). Much of the Dutch public debt has quite a long 
maturity, however, and the reduction in the interest bill will therefore 
initially be much smaller than the reduction in short nominal interest rates 
times the value of the debt. 
If the Netherlands were to try to satisfy the Maastricht debt norm, there 
would have to be severe cuts in public spending or large increases in tax 
rates. This would also have to happen very swiftly. The associated costs 
cannot be justified with commensurate benefits. The restructuring of public 
expenditure and revenue in the Netherlands (which has been going on for years) 
should continue as planned, without paying attention to the distractions of 
Maastricht. Fear of sanctions need not deter the Dutch policy makers, since 
the relevant clauses in the Treaty contain enough ambiguities to keep the 
Council of Ministers occupied for the next 50 years. 
It is obvious that countries like (in ascending order of seriousness) 
Ireland, Belgium, Italy and Greece have serious budgetary problems. In the 
case of Greece, with its staggering "flow" problem, it is indeed hard to see 
any economically feasible strategy for restoring budgetary equilibrium that 
would command a political majority, unless a partial (de jure or de facto) 
internal debt default is included in the package. It may be called a "debt 
consolidation", with an "interest moratorium", but the economic essence will 
be that of a debt repudiation. 
We do not need the Maastricht norms to tell us that a country is in 
trouble, and by being so obviously infeasible in the case of the four 
countries just mentioned, the Maastricht norms may actually weaken the case 
for fiscal retrenchment where it is necessary. 
It is regrettable that a serious Treaty runs the risk of having its 
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overall credibility undermined because it contains a few arbitrary numbers. 
The authors of the Delors Report, although also in the grip of the same 
central bank fiscal-political prejudices, at least had the good sense not to 
come up with precise figures for debt and deficit targets 14. It is very 
unfortunate that this restraint was abandoned in Maastricht. It appears that 
this was the political price that had to paid to keep the German negotiators 
(looking over their shoulders at the Bundesbank) happy 1s Whatever the 
reason, the price is too high. 
(4) Conclusion. 
Ve should only worry about the fiscal numerology of Maastricht if the 
Netherlands (or any other country) were to take the two quantitative reference 
values seriously and if budgetary policy were to be directed at the 
achievement of the debt and deficit targets. Fortunately there is no 
compelling reason to shoot ourselves in the foot in this manner. 
The benefits of a common currency are small (see Commission of the 
European Communities [1990]). Compared with a system of credibly fixed 
exchange rates between national currencies, these benefits consist in the 
saving of transaction costs associated with the replacement of several 
national currencies by the ECU, and in the opportunity for competing somewhat 
more effectively with the Yen and the US dollar as international reserve and 
vehicle currencies. For individual member states the distribution of the 
internal and external seigniorage of the ESCB-ECB is also important. The 
costs and benefits of the non-monetary aspects of economic union (the single 
market, economic aspects of the protocol on social policy) are independent of 
the success or failure of monetary union. 
The costs of a common currency are non-negligible. These consist mainly 
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in the costs of any system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates in comparison 
with a flexible exchange rate regime. Each member state loses the opportunity 
of pursuing an optimal nationally differentiated inflation policy. Since the 
EC members differ greatly in their ability to levy non-inflation taxes, this 
restriction on the national fiscal policy arsenals may well be serious for 
some countries. 
In addition, the larger and less open member states lose a mechanism that 
enables them to achieve necessary changes in international relative prices and 
costs more rapidly and with less costs than would be possible through 
variations in relative national nominal costs and prices. As far as I know, 
no-one has even demonstrated that the twelve member countries of the EC form 
an "optimal currency area". 
With a common currency, national exchange rate adjustments and nationally 
differentiated monetary policy disappear from the stabilization arsenal. The 
importance of flexibility in the use of the remaining national stabilization 
instrument, national fiscal policy, is correspondingly enhanced. Debt and 
deficit ceilings impair that flexibility and with it each member state's 
ability to respond to nationally differentiated shocks. Futhermore, the debt 
and deficit ceilings do nothing to ensure an appropriate aggregate 
fiscal-monetary mix for the EC as a whole. 
For a small, highly open economy like the Netherlands, which has had a 
fixed exchange rate with the D-mark for many years, it will make very little 
difference whether it adopts a common currency (the ECU) or holds on to its 
national currency and maintains a fixed exchange rate with the ECU. If the 
price of a single European currency is the fiscal strait-jacket of Maastricht, 
it would be better to forgo monetary union. 
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Appendix 
Some simple debt arithmetic. 
The following symbols and definitions are used. bis the ratio to GDP of 
government debt held outside the central bank; Be is the stock of nominal 
government debt held by the central bank; be is the ratio to GDP of government 
debt held by the central bank; o is the ratio to GDP of the government primary 
(non-interest) deficit, excluding profits of the central bank appropriated by 
the government; o is the ratio to GDP of the government primary deficit, 
including central bank profits; dis the ratio to GDP of the government 
deficit, including interest payments; 0 is the ratio to GDP of central bank 
profits appropriated by the government; i is the nominal interest rate on 
* government debt; R is the stock of official foreign exchange reserves; i is 
the interest rate on official foreign reserves; e is the nominal spot exchange 
rate; c is the cost, as a fraction of GDP, of running the central bank; Y is 
real GDP; pis the GDP deflator; g is the growth rate of nominal GDP; sis the 
ratio to GDP of the change in credit extended to the government by the central 
bank ("seigniorage"). Ve assume that the government appropriates all central 
. * _ Be _ . c i eRbank profits. It follows that: s =~ ; O=1b + ~ - C ; 0 =0 - 0 ; 
d =o + i(b + be) 
The government budget identity can be written as: 
. -
(Al) b =[i - g] b + o(t) - 0 + ibc - s = -gb + d - s. 
The solution to equation (Al) is 
t t t 
(A2) b(t) = b(o)exp[-/ g(u)du] +/{exp[-/ g(u)du]}[d(v) - s(v)]dv 
0 0 V 
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b(o) = b is the initial value of the ratio to GDP of government debt 
0 
(excluding debt held by the central bank). If the growth rate of nominal 
GDP is constant, equation (A2) simplifies to 
t 
(A3) b(t) = b exp[-gt] + J {exp~g(t-v)]}[d(v) - s(v)]dv
0 
0 
The first question we can answer with the aid of equation (A3) is: if 
from now on (now is t = 0) the Netherlands were to stick to the Maastricht 
* norm for the deficit (d(v) = d = 0.03), then how long would it take until the 
* country would also satisfy the Maastricht norm for the debt (b(t) = b = 0.6)? 
If seigniorage, s, is also constant, the answer to that question is given by 
equation (A4). 
(A4) t = -
The answer to the question as to how small should be the constant 
deficit-GDP ratio, d, if the country has to satisfy the Maastricht norm for 




b - b e 
0(A5) d = g[---~] + s 
1 - e- gt 
If the Maastricht norm is for the ratio to GDP of total general 
government debt, including the debt held by the central bank, the arithmetic 
- -
is even easier. Let b be the total debt to GDP ratio, that is b =b + be. It 
follows that 
(A6) b = (i - g)b + 8 
or 
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(A7) b = -gb + d 
By settings= 0 in formulas (A4) and (A5), they can be made to apply to 
total government debt. In Table 3, the time interval until the debt norm is 
reached will be slightly longer. In Table 4, the deficit required to bring 
the Netherlands to the debt target in a given period of time will be slightly 
lower. Equations (A6) and (A7) should not be allowed to obscure the fact that 
borrowing from the central bank is effectively interest-free, since the 
government appropriates the profits of the central bank. This becomes 
apparent when we rewrite (A7) as 
* 
i eR + c( A 7') b = -gb + i b + o- pl 
Assume (as seems likely) that c is independent of be and ignore the small 
* 
income-from-international-reserves component ~yeR. Past general government 
borrowing from the central bank instead of from the general public causes the 
* 
current government deficit, d = 6- ~YeR + c + ib , associated with any given 
non-central bank primary deficit, o, and any given nominal interest rate, i , 16 
to be smaller than it would otherwise have been. 
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1For the twelve EC members the average debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios 
were as follows (source: EC). 
General Gvt. General Gvt. 
Gross Debt Net Borrowing 
7o GDP 7o GDP 
1981 45.5 5.3 
1982 50.3 5.5 
1983 53.3 5.3 
1984 56.4 5.3 
1985 59.1 5.2 
1986 60.0 4.8 
1987 61.5 4.2 
1988 61.0 3.7 
1989 60.3 2.9 
1990 60.3 4.1 
2In a stationary continuous time equilibrium, the constant ratio to GDP 
of government debt held outside the central bank, b, the constant ratio of the 
government deficit to GDP, d, the constant growth rate of nominal GDP, g and 
the constant ratio to GDP of credit extended to the government by the central 
bank, s, have the following relationship to each other: b = d ~ s 
3See Douglas Adams [1982] Life, the Universe and Everything. Some 
experts argue that the correct answer is 54. 
4It is important to distinguish between the market value of public sector 
assets (on the assumption that they are transferred to private ownership) and 
their "continuation value" (the present discounted value of their 
contributions to the future primary (non-interest) surpluses of the government
should they remain government-owned). Both valuations can differ from their 
social value. 
5 In calculating the social rate of return on a public sector investment 
project, one should of course allow for the costs associated with any
unavoidable distortionary financing of the project. 
6According to this theory the ratio of distortionary taxes to GDP 
(sometimes referred to rather mysteriously as the "average marginal tax rate")
equals the sum of the average expected future value of the ratio of exhaustive 
public spending to GDP and the permanent cost of servicing the current debt 
(as a fraction of GDP). Let b be the public debt-GDP ratio, r the 
instantaneous real rate of interest, n the instantaneous growth rate of real 
GDP, 7 the ratio of exhaustive public spending to GDP and r the ratio of 
distortionary tax receipts to GDP. For simplicity seigniorage is ignored . 
. 
The government budget identity can be written as b = (r - n)b + 7 - r. Define 
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permanent public spending by 
w s 1w sP7 (t) = [/{exp[-/(r(u)-n(u))du]}ds]- /{exp[-/(r(u)-n(u))du]}7(s)ds and 
t t t t 
permanent debt service by pP(t)b(t) where 
A w s 1 
p(t) = [/{exp[-/(r(u)-n(u))du]}ds]- . The theory implies that the optimal 
t t 
A 
value of r, r say, is given by 
. 
;(t) = 7P(t) + pP(t)b(t). It follows that;= O, that is r is (expected to 
remain) constant or follows a random walk. The increase in the public . 
debt-GDP ratio is then given by b(t) = 7(t) - 7P(t) + [r(t)-n(t)-pP(t)]b(t).
If the current value of public spending equals its permanent value, and if the 
excess of the instantaneous real interest rate over the instantaneous real 
growth rate equals the excess of the long-run real interest rate over the 
long-run real growth rate, then the public debt also follows a random walk. 
7If there are persistent national differences in productivity growth 
rates in the non-traded goods sectors, national inflation differences can 
persist even with a common currency. 
Sit is regrettable that the inflation convergence criterion rules out the 
use of EMU by a member country to imporove its anti-inflationary reputation
and posture, just as the EMS is often argued to have done for countries like 
Italy and France. 
DSee e.g. Hamilton and Flavin (19861 and Buiter and Patel (1992]. In 
Buiter and Kletzer [1992 a,b] we argue that this solvency criterion is too 
strict in growing economies. We suggest that the present discounted value 
that should ultimately stay non-positive is the real debt discounted at the 
sum of the real interest rate and the real growth rate. 
tOThe counterfactual to the borrowing is current tax financing using the 
most broadly-based, least distortionary taxes. The effect on the interest 
rates of other countries is most easily appreciated when there are credibly
fixed exchange rates or a common currency. It is also quite likely to be 
true, however, if the exchange rate floats. Exchange rate risk need not be 
affected appreciably by the choice between current taxes and borrowing. 
11In Buiter and Kletzer (1991a,b], we develop this ar~ent at greater
length, both at a non-technical level (Buiter and Kletzer L1991b]) and at a 
technical level (Buiter and Kletzer (1991a]). 
12International mutual insurance against this form of sovereign risk 
cannot be effective due to "moral hazard" problems. 
1awe need the seigniorage projection only if the debt under consideration 
is general government debt held outside the central bank. If the debt total 
and the debt norm refer to general government debt including that held by the 
central bank, no seigniorage projections are required. Tables 3 and 4 withs 
equal to zero would give slightly higher values oft (the length of the period
until the debt norm is reached) and slightly lower values of d (the value of 
the deficit required to reach the debt norm at a specific future date). 
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14See Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors
Committee)[1989]. 
15A Machiavellian interpretation of the Bundesbank's advocacy of 
infeasible debt norms is that they are hoped and expected to delay EMU, and 
especially the move to a common currency, until well into the next century and 
perhaps to prevent it from occurring altogether. One motivating factor could 
be the universal bureaucratic trait that no organization ever cooperates
enthusiastically and wholeheartedly with a venture that will result in its 
demise. Second, German monetary officials must realize that they will never 
be as influential in the ESCB and the ECD following EMU and with a common 
currency, as they are today in the EMS with the D-Mark. By contrast, French 
and Italian monetary officials can anticipate an increase in their influence 
following EMU, after many frustrating years of subordination to the Bundesbank 
in the EMS. This may account for their continued enthusiasm for EMU. 
16The nominal interest rate on government debt, i, need not stay the same 
under alternative financing modes. In a complete analysis, the extent to 
which past monetary financing raises the current expected inflation rate and 
the extent to which higher expected inflation raises the current nominal 
interest rate must also be considered. 
